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Same Content, Different Wrapping:
Cross-Strait Policy Under DPP Rule
Mikael Mattlin
1 In the popular and especially Peking’s view, there is a substantial difference between
the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Kuomintang (KMT) with regard to their
position on cross-Strait political relations. But how great is this difference in reality?
These past four years of the DPP’s first term in power provide us with the evidence of
the DPP’s  cross-Strait  policy in action,  evidence that enables this  comparison to be
made.  The  first  two  years  of  Chen  Shui-bian’s  first  term  as  president  saw  a  more
conciliatory policy, which became a tougher approach starting in the late summer of
2002. On the whole the DPP’s cross-Strait political relations diverged surprisingly little
from a trajectory set already in the last years of KMT rule: of maintaining the ROC state
in the face of  increasing international  isolation;  the insistence on the position that
Taiwan  is  an  independent  state;  and  frequent  signalling  of  openness  to  talks  with
Peking as long as these did not include a “one China” policy as a precondition. 
2 The article first briefly analyses the circumstances surrounding the election victory of
Chen Shui-bian in 2000, compares KMT and DPP policies towards mainland China, and
assesses  the  ups  and downs of  cross-Strait  relations  under  the  Chen presidency.  It
further identifies some structural constraints shaping the relationship and that foster a
continuity of policy across regimes: Lee Teng-hui’s “legacy people” in Chen Shui-bian’s
cross-Strait policy apparatus, the domestic political stalemate in Taiwan, and structural
differences in policy-making in Taipei and Peking that make it  difficult for the two
parties to achieve agreement on anything substantial and tend to cause the positions to
revert to one of no significant change. The article ends with a discussion of the changes
that took place in cross-Strait politics with the change of administration. 
The 2000 surprise change 
3 Chen’s victory in 2000 was in many ways premature. Many within the DPP had set their
sights on the 2004 elections. Only a year before the elections it looked like Chen Shui-
bian, who had lost the Taipei mayoral elections in December 1998, would not stand a
chance. But the soured relations between Lee Teng-hui and Soong Chu-yu came to a
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head, resulting in Soong leaving the KMT and running as an independent against party-
nominated Lien Chan, and as it turned out, sealing Chen’s victory. The day after his
victory at the DPP campaign headquarters, a campaign organiser—asked how they were
going to handle the Peking relationship—said the campaign team had spent the whole
night thinking about this particular issue as, not expecting to win, they had not really
prepared for it in advance 1. 
4 The DPP came to power with an inexperienced team. Nowhere was this clearer than in
cross-Strait  policy-making.  The  new  administration  was forced  to  sift  through
academia and old KMT hands in its search for suitable talent that it could use. Even so,
it was criticised for using many inexperienced young people. Much of the beginning of
the term was therefore a mix of governing enthusiasm, naïve optimism and policy flip-
flops, as election promises met with realities of government.
5 Chen adopted a conciliatory tone towards Peking in his inaugural speech on May 20th
2000,  saying  that  as  long  as  Peking  had  no  intention  to  use  military  force  against
Taiwan, he pledged that during his term of office he would not declare independence,
not change the Taiwan’s national title, not push ahead with the inclusion of the so-
called “state-to-state” description in the constitution, and not promote a referendum
to change the status quo with regard to the question of independence or unification. In
addition, Chen pledged that the abolition of neither the National Reunification Council,
nor the National Reunification Guidelines would become an issue2. On the other hand,
the  speech  also  contained  some  provocative  rhetoric,  such  as  the  speech  theme
“Taiwan stands up”; an obvious play on Mao Zedong’s famous words in 19493. 
6 The  new administration’s  naïve  optimism was  abundantly  clear  with  respect  to  its
mainland  policy,  where  it  seems  that  many  in  the  new  administration  genuinely
believed that small  goodwill  gestures,  such as opening up the so-called three small
links, limited opening of travel for mainland businessmen, professionals and tourists to
Taiwan, and significant toning down of independence rhetoric would induce Peking to
return to the negotiation table4. The administration did not get the response it sought.
7 The  shock  at  Chen’s  victory  was  evident  in  Peking.  Few  mainland  scholars  even
considered Chen as being in the race for the presidency (at least publicly)5. Apparently
only the Chinese National Security Bureau had the guts to predict that Chen might
win6. Nevertheless, in the public sphere Peking sensibly refrained from rash judgement,
instead adopting a cautious policy towards the Chen administration. On the day of the
election the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council announced that no matter who
the new leader of  Taiwan would be they would “listen to his  words and watch his
actions” (jiang ting qi yan, guan qi xing) to see in which direction he would take cross-
Strait relations7. 
KMT and DPP formal cross-Strait policy
8 The  KMT  position  on  cross-Strait  relations  underwent  considerable  modification
during  the  1990s.  The  decade  started  with  a  substantial  number  of  “Old  Guard”
mainlanders  in  leading  positions  within  the  party  and  an  essentially  unchanged
mainland  policy  since  the  time  of  Chiang  Kai-shek.  In  1991  the  KMT  government
dropped its claim to rule over all of China in the first of a series of six constitutional
amendments. But the party still adhered to the idea of one China, although disagreeing
with  Peking  over  the  interpretation  of  the  concept,  as  evident  in  the  supposed
consensus revolving around “one China, with different interpretations” (yi ge Zhongguo
gezi biaoshu) achieved in Hong Kong in 1992 as a preparation for the Singapore talks in
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1993. This consensus has, however, since been disputed in Taiwan by both the KMT
government and the DPP8. 
9 The Old Guard within the KMT grew increasingly uncomfortable with Lee Teng-hui’s
more obvious localisation policies in the early 1990s and finally left the party in 1993 to
form the New Party. Mainland/Taiwan relations began to deteriorate after Lee Teng-
hui’s visit to the United States and the missile rehearsals in 1995-96, and hit a low point
in July 1999 when Lee Teng-hui talked about “special state-to-state” relations (teshu de
guo yu guo guanxi) in a Deutsche Welle interview. The 1999 statement followed earlier
similar but less provocative formulations.  In 1997 the ROC government had already
sharpened its stance by saying that one should talk about one divided China 9,  while
through 1997-98 Lee Teng-hui several times mentioned that the ROC is an independent
sovereign nation. The KMT’s position on Taiwan’s status seems to have moved with Lee
Teng-hui’s position during the 1990s towards more clearly emphasising Taiwan as a
separate entity. 
10 The DPP, on its part, has moderated its official stance on cross-Strait relations since the
party charter of 1991, which contained a clause on working towards independence. On
October  20th 2001,  the  DPP Party  Congress  decided to  elevate  a  resolution (Taiwan
qiantu jueyiwen) from May 8th 1999, to guiding line in its mainland policy10.  The key
point in the 1999 document is that the DPP already regards Taiwan as an independent,
sovereign nation and therefore sees no need to declare independence. This could be
construed as a moderation of the DPP’s earlier position. The document also insisted
that any change to this status quo would require the consent of the people through a
referendum11.  The new interpretation had been flouted publicly  a  year  earlier  in  a
seven-point  statement  by  the  DPP  Central  Standing  Committee,  apparently  as  a
response to Clinton’s visit to China and his so-called three no’s statement12. 
11 In August 2002 Chen Shui-bian used the characterisation “one country on each side” (yi
bian yi guo) to describe cross-Strait relations. Chen’s new concept and an earlier DPP
document entitled Cross-century China Policy White Paper both echo Lee’s state-to-state
relations13. Thus, the two main political parties, having started the 1990s with radically
different cross-Strait policies, ended the decade with substantially converged positions.
12 Peking, for its part, spelled out its Taiwan position perhaps most clearly in a White
Paper14 published just before the 2000 election. It explains how Peking sees the dispute
over Taiwan; why it regards Taiwan as belonging to itself; elaborates on the importance
of the one China principle; and gives indications of what its bottom-line in the conflict
might be. 
13 The one China principle  continues to  be the cornerstone of  Peking’s  stance on the
Taiwan issue. However, Peking seems to have realised in recent years that it needs to
show some flexibility on this. Consequently, it has tried to widen its definition of one
China,  most  notably  perhaps  in  a  new  formulation  first  mentioned  by  the  former
Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen that “There is only one China in the world. Both
the mainland and Taiwan belong to the same one China, and China’s sovereignty and
territorial integrity are inseparable”15. 
The cross-Strait rollercoaster
14 The  first  two  years  of  Chen’s  administration  were  a  chequered  story  perhaps  best
characterised by such phrases as “haphazard”, “fits and starts” and “damage control”.
Domestic  politics  quickly  took  over  the  agenda  as  one  crisis  followed  the  other,
seemingly non-stop. Cross-Strait relations were of necessity put on a backburner and
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most  cross-Strait  initiatives  during  this  time  were  small  technical/administrative
issues dealt with by the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), such as opening the so-called
three small links, preparation for the three big links, allowing mainland investments in
some  economic  sectors,  and  gradual  opening  up  of  visits  to  Taiwan  by  mainland
tourists, professionals and businessmen. Semi-official “soundings” continued through a
handful of unofficial and semi-official envoys, such as Chen Chung-hsin a DPP legislator
who heads the party’s Mainland Affairs Department, and Hong Chi-chang—two of the
few DPP people acceptable to Peking16. But apparently these came to naught as political
positions still remained too far apart17. 
15 Having finally regained its balance in domestic politics, the presidential office returned
to  the  cross-Strait  fray  in  August  2002.  By  the  summer  of  2002,  the  key  actors  in
Taipei’s cross-Strait policy-making were very disappointed at what they saw as Peking’s
failure to respond in a positive way to what they thought of as their own expressions of
goodwill; a moderate inauguration speech by Chen in 2000, unilateral opening of the
three small links and expressions of a willingness to talk about anything, as long as the
one China principle was not a precondition for talks, to name a few18. 
16 The Nauru-incident,  when allegedly  Nauru  was  bought  off  by  Peking  and switched
political recognition was the apparent trigger for a rhetorical sharpening of Taipei’s
mainland policy. When even staunch unificationist Elmer Feng appeared content with
Chen Shui-bian’s cross-Strait policies, DPP insiders realised that it was time to take two
steps back in order not to lose all political bargaining chips19. In quick succession Chen
Shui-bian made several statements talking about “one country on each side” and about
a possible defensive referendum, for the first time as a realistic option. This set the
tone for cross-Strait relations for the latter two years of Chen’s first term. Tensions
between  Taipei  and  Peking,  simmering  since  July  1999,  rose  a  few  more  notches
following the inclusion of  the word “Taiwan” on ROC passports,  Chen’s  visit  to the
United  States,  and  not  least  after  Taiwan  announced  a  “defensive  referendum”  in
conjunction with the 2004 presidential election.
17 Peking was extremely unhappy about the referendum, which it saw as a ploy to take
Taiwan one step further towards outright independence by introducing a procedure
through  which  for  example  constitutional  changes  could  be  sanctioned20.  The
Communist leadership’s trust in Chen Shui-bian, which had been low to begin with, fell
to  a  nadir.  But  Peking  refrained  from  repeating  the  mistake  it  had  done  during
previous elections of coming with a direct and harsh warning to Taiwan voters just
before the election, unless warnings to Hong Kong before Taiwan’s presidential election
are regarded as a veiled threat to Taiwan. 
18 Taipei  had,  through  the  referendum,  taken  one  step  further  away  politically  from
Peking, but had fallen short of crossing the proverbial “red line”, which is starting to
look like a moving target. Peking, to its relief, found a face-saving exit in arguing that
the  fact  that  the  referendum  voter  turnout  did  not  exceed  50%  showed  that  the
Taiwanese people rejected Chen’s policies21, and was not forced to act. “Watching his
deeds, listening to his words” seems to have been taken rather literally in Peking. 
19 Peking stuck to its cautiousness regarding public action after the election. The Taiwan
Affairs  Office  issued  a  seven-point  statement  before  the  inauguration  speech.  The
statement contained the usual vague and unspecific rhetorical threats and a diatribe
about Chen having broken all the promises he made in 2000 and being untrustworthy.
However, it also notably did not mention the “one country, two systems” policy, while
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it did adopt the new and slightly more flexible “one China” formulation in lieu of the
“one China” principle22. 
20 On the whole, the PRC government adopted a passive role towards Taiwan in Chen’s
first term. Whether this is a reflection of Peking being at a loss for options23, or having
decided to let economic integration take care of the Taiwan problem, or just silence
before the storm, is hard to tell. But whichever the case, the long-term trend towards
Taiwan’s clearer political separation from the mainland, which had started during Lee
Teng-hui’s years as president continued in a similar piecemeal pattern during Chen’s
first term. 
Continuity in cross-Strait relations—structural determinants
21 There are  a  number of  reasons  for  continuity  in  cross-Strait  policy,  many of  them
structural in nature24. One obvious source of policy continuity in Taipei is the simple
fact that the DPP, short on talent in the cross-Strait policy-making area, made use of
several people left over from the Lee Teng-hui administration25. Key cross-Strait policy-
making insiders, who followed on to the next administration were for example Tsai
Ing-wen, the MAC Chairperson in Chen’s first administration, Chang Jung-feng, Deputy
Secretary  General  of  the  National  Security  Council  until  the  summer  of  2003,  Lin
Chong-pin,  who  continued  as  vice-chairman  of  MAC  and  NSC  member,  and  later
became Deputy Minister of Defence, Wu Rong-yi, president of the Taiwan Institute of
Economic Research (TIER), and Tien Hung-mao, one of Lee Teng-hui’s policy advisors,
who became the  first  Foreign  Minister  in  the  Chen government.  The  first  two  are
commonly believed to be the  “brains”  behind Lee’s  1999 state-to-state  comments26.
Chen also inherited Lee’s  military and security apparatuses almost intact.  Not until
some 15 months after taking office did Chen carry out a reshuffle of leading positions
within the military/security apparatus, replacing several Lee Teng-hui loyalists with
his own people27.
22 The marching order in Taiwan’s cross-Strait policy-making was described by a high-
ranking government official in an interview as the President―the National Security
Council―the Executive Yuan—the MAC28. Since Chen’s re-election, DPP stalwarts have
taken over many key positions. Chiou I-jen returned to the post of Secretary-General of
the National Security Council (NSC), while Parris Chang became Deputy Head of the
National Security Council and DPP Legislator Chen Chung-hsin was appointed senior
advisor to the NSC. Joseph Wu was appointed the new MAC Chairman, while former
Taipei County Commissioner Su Tseng-chang now heads the Presidential Office29. The
new Foreign Minister  Chen Tang-sun is  known for  his  strong support  for  Taiwan’s
separate identity. Meanwhile, the current cabinet continues to be headed by Yu Shyi-
kun, Chen’s 2000 election campaign director and former DPP Secretary-General. The
first cabinet was initially headed by Tang Fei, a former KMT Minister of Defence. 
23 A  second  structural  source  of  non-change  in  cross-Strait  policy  was the  domestic
political stalemate in Taiwan30. Although Chen might have wanted to move faster on
several  fronts,  as  anecdotal  evidence  suggests31,  he  was  recurrently  blocked  by  a
Legislative Yuan he did not control. The legislative majority was in the hands of the
“pan-blues”  (WW,  fan  lan),  who  narrowly  managed  to  retain  the  majority  in  the
December 2001 Legislative Yuan elections. Even parts of Chen’s own administration and
party were unruly and obstructionist. The first two years often left the impression that
Chen Shui-bian was charging ahead on his own, oblivious to his administration, party
or  the  opposition.  When this  obviously  did  not  work,  Chen convened the  so-called
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Economic  Development  Advisory  Conference  (EDAC)  in  the  late  summer  of  2001
apparently  in  order  to  calm the turbulent political  situation through this  inclusive
forum.  Chen  also  introduced  regular  co-ordinating  procedures  between  the
presidential office, the DPP party headquarters and key DPP legislators in the summer
of 2002 to at least bring his own “team” better on board32. 
24 But the fundamental predicament remained: the Legislative Yuan was still in the hands
of the pan-blues and major changes were therefore unlikely, unless they were in areas
which  the  pan-blues  would  find  hard  to  oppose  due  to  popular  support,  like  the
Referendum Act that finally passed almost as a pan-blue drafted version in late 200333,
or  the  decision  to  halve  the  legislature34.  Chen  then  found  himself  juggling  with
contradictory requirements from Peking, the opposition and not the least those of the
DPP’s  “core”  supporters  who  wanted  to  move  more  aggressively  towards  clearer
independence. Chen’s weak domestic position was naturally well known also on the
mainland side35, and Peking was therefore reluctant to enter into any kind of political
talks with Chen, instead hoping that Chen’s administration would be only a temporary
aberration.
25 Taipei’s cross-Strait policy cannot be considered without paying attention to Peking’s
stance. A famous adage by Tip O’Neill says that all politics is local. There is no reason to
doubt that this is the case also in mainland China and Taiwan. A Taiwanese expert on
the  PRC  has  argued  that  Taiwan’s  internal  dynamics  normally  rank  below  China’s
domestic  situation  and  the  international  environment  (in  particular  relations  to
Washington)  in  determining  Peking’s  Taiwan  policy36.  Similarly,  much  of  Taiwan
politics,  including  Taipei’s  cross-Strait  policy,  is  affected  by  the  island’s  recurrent
elections.  Taken  together,  these  domestic  constraints  make  cross-Strait  “openings”
difficult and likely to come to nothing, as the counterpart is usually unable to respond
in the desired way, due to pressures from domestic audiences. 
26 The PRC’s Taiwan policy-making is structurally conservative. Scholars have argued that
even though individual minds within the policy-making elite would be open to new
ideas, several structural and procedural factors constrain creativity in decision-making
and biases towards maintaining the existing policy line. Changing the basic position in
any  direction,  but  in  particular  as  regards  the  one-China  principle,  becomes
exceedingly difficult. For example, Jiang Zemin seemed unable to drop the idea of “one
country, two systems”, which tended to keep the formula afloat although it is obviously
a stillborn idea in Taiwan37. Until recently, Jiang still retained a central role in Taiwan
policy-making38. It remains to be seen whether Jiang’s stepping down from chairing the
Military Affairs Commission will bring more flexibility to Taiwan policy-making.  
27 One  scholar  sees the  lack  of  institutionalisation  of  PRC  domestic  politics  and  the
vulnerability  of  the  regime’s  legitimacy  base  as  major  sources  of  its  inflexibility39.
Whatever  the  reasons,  the  current  cross-Strait  policy-making  apparatus  in  Peking
could probably be described as cautious, deliberative and conservative, reflecting an
over-arching need to maintain social and political stability. Major changes in policy are
rare and thoroughly planned.
28 In  comparison,  Taipei’s  cross-Strait  policy-making  under Chen  has  been  activist,
impatient and somewhat haphazard, driven partly by a need to introduce new themes
and  tout  policy  “achievements”  before  every  major  election.  Whereas  we  may
hypothesise that Chiang Ching-kuo’s administration probably worked more similarly to
Peking’s today and Lee Teng-hui’s administration still retained elements of it due to the
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one-party legacy, Chen Shui-bian’s administration so far has had a different style of
working, starting from the president surrounding himself with thirty-something rising
stars instead of a venerable gerontocracy, and being driven very much by opinion polls,
media and election considerations, perhaps a bit like Clinton’s administration.
29 To what  extent  Taipei’s  impatience is  a  reflection of  Chen’s  personality  is  an open
question. Close observers tend to describe Chen as a kind of impatient whirlwind who
wants to get things done fast40. But one could also argue that it is a function of Taiwan’s
fast-paced  political  scene.  Frequently,  by  the  time  Peking  has  come  around  to  an
official reaction to some event in Taipei, Taiwanese attention has already moved on to
the next political show. For example, it took the Chinese state media until January 8th
2004 to offer an indirect reaction to the pan-blue camp’s “surprise” endorsement of the
Referendum Act in November 200341, while it took almost two months for the Taiwan
Affairs Office of the State Council and its counterpart within the Communist Party to
come back with an official reaction to Chen’s re-election42. In this sense, the mental gap
between Peking and Taipei has grown in the past years. Of course, things are changing
in Peking as well as younger leaders prefer less ritual and pomp and more tangible
action.  But  there  is  still  a  gap  and  Peking  genuinely  seems  to  have  a  hard  time
understanding Chen Shui-bian.
30 These two machineries can perhaps be characterised as two trains moving at different
speeds: Taipei’s bullet train is charging ahead impatiently craving for tangible results,
but  by  the  time Peking’s  slower  workhorse  reaches  the  station,  Taipei  has  already
become  frustrated  and  moved  on  to  the  next  stop.  The  gap  never  closes  and  the
frustration  is  mutual.  To  make  matters  worse,  in  cross-Strait  policy  it  seems  that
Peking’s preference is for clarity, whereas Taipei finds it has more room for manoeuvre
the greater the obscurity. Chen Shui-bian talked vaguely about “integration” (tonghe) as
a basis for cross-Strait relations early in his first term43,  while recently he made an
ambiguous reference to the Hong Kong 1992 meeting as a basis for discussions44. Peking
has been far more consistent in insisting acceptance of “one China” is the only basis for
talks and peaceful relations. Only the definition and formulation of “one China” has
subtly evolved.
31 Thus, even if Chen Shui-bian initially set out to genuinely achieve a breakthrough in
cross-Strait relations, this structural discord makes achieving any significant change
inordinately  difficult.  Not  surprisingly,  Chen  reverted  to  an  earlier  more
confrontational position with regard to Peking and handling of cross-Strait relations.
The structural constellation tends to push policy back to a gridlock, where both sides
insist  on  the  other  side  accepting  preconditions  for  talks.  At  the  beginning  of  his
second term, Chen once more seems to be trying a more conciliatory approach. He will
probably be frustrated again. 
Changes: the subtle and not-so-subtle
32 We need however to point out that there are also a few notable areas of subtle and not-
so-subtle change in cross-Strait relations between the late Lee Teng-hui years and Chen
Shui-bian’s  reign.  One of  the major areas of  change concerns the state of  trilateral
communications and trust between Taipei, Peking and Washington. Another possible
change concerns the clearer role Taipei has taken in setting the cross-Strait political
agenda and therefore “driving” cross-Strait relations, if only by default.
33 A major problem in the current state of  cross-Strait  relations is  a  serious break in
communication channels. Even semi-official communication channels between Taipei
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and  Peking  have  been  down  since  Lee  Teng-hui’s  1999  “state-to-state”  comments.
Before those statements, semi-official channels were open and relations cordial to the
extent that envoys Koo Chen-fu and Wang Daohan were able to meet in Shanghai less
than  a  year  before.  As  noted  above,  during  Chen’s  presidency,  Taipei-Peking
communication appears  confined to  the  occasional  messenger,  a  few private  secret
meetings, rhetorical shadow-boxing and occasional trial balloons. 
34 At the same time, Taipei-Washington communication channels have also been troubled,
to say the least, after Chen’s coming to power. Chen’s 2000 presidential election victory
had been largely unexpected in Washington. As a consequence, there were few people
in  the  United  States  who  had  good  contacts  with  the  DPP  leaders  or  a  good
understanding  of  the  party.  Chen’s  perceived  unpredictability  has  also  generally
lowered  trust  in  him  in  Washington,  even  among  traditional  Taiwan  supporters45.
There is empirical evidence to suggest that Washington has not been well informed in
advance of several of Chen’s more controversial initiatives, such as the “one country on
each side” statements and the referendum plan. 
35 A  pattern  has  already  emerged:  Chen  makes  a  sudden  controversial  statement;
Washington is astounded after which key officials in the Chen administration rush to
Washington to explain Chen’s intentions. Now, there is of course the possibility that
this is only a show and that in reality Washington has been briefed in advance. But
from Taipei having to back down and moderate the formulation of the referendum
questions due to strong pressure from Washington to the seemingly genuine surprise
and dismay of  seasoned American Taiwan-watchers  at  some of  Chen’s  actions,  this
appears  unlikely.  Needless  to  say,  in  the  current  state  of  heightened  cross-Strait
tensions,  bad  communication  is  a  potentially  dangerous  added  source  of
misunderstanding and miscalculation.  
36 It  has  been common  to  regard  cross-Strait  relations  as  being  decided  on  the  axis
between Peking and Washington. Certainly, Peking believes it can handle the problem
directly with Washington without needing to talk to Taipei46. But this view fails to take
into  account  that  neither  Washington  nor  Peking  currently  have  either  a  clear
consensus on how to handle Taiwan, or an interest in actively changing the situation.
And neither does Taiwan, in an absolute sense. However, relatively speaking, one could
argue that Taiwan currently actually has a stronger consensus on cross-Strait relations
than either mainland China or the United States47; one revolving around maintaining
the status quo. On the other hand, there is also a realisation in Taiwan that the status
quo,  if  left  unattended,  will  inevitably  lead  to  slow  absorption  by  China  through
unstoppable economic integration and a steadily squeezing international space. This
provides a strong impetus for a more activist approach in Taipei among those who
dread to see this happen.
37 It seems that Taipei has been pushing hard lately for the international community to
confront  the  problem of  Taiwan’s  international  status,  well  aware  that  most  other
countries are now ready to turn their eyes away if Taiwan is absorbed by the PRC, due
to China’s greater economic importance. Chen has apparently purposely “pushed the
envelope” repeatedly by making provocative statements or creating events that draw
international attention to Taiwan. One such signal was the referendum organised in
conjunction with the 2004 presidential election and the 2-28 mass rally accompanying
it48,  which was seen as  highly provocative both by Peking and by many in Taiwan.
Another  was  the  campaign  for  WHA  observer  status.  Whether  these  actions  have
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worked in the desired way or not is debatable.  What they do seem to have done is
snatch the cross-Strait steering wheel at least for the time being to Taipei. Talk of a
new or revised Constitution by 2006 and earlier hints of a possible referendum on it49 is
now setting the  timetable  for  cross-Strait  relations.  A  sense  of  urgency among the
independence-minded in Taipei is creating an equal sense of urgency in Peking50. So, if
only by default, the agenda for cross-Strait relations is now largely set in Taipei. A crisis
is already scheduled for some time between 2006 and 2008.
38 Of  course,  it  is  open  to  debate  whether  Taipei’s  increased  activism  in  cross-Strait
matters started with Chen Shui-bian. One could make a good case that a more activist
role was taken already by Lee Teng-hui in his last years in office by an active “dollar
diplomacy”,  frequent  visits  by  the  president  abroad,  several  constitutional
amendments and attempts to define a clearer separate status for Taiwan in speeches
and writings. However, it is probably too simple to see Chen just as a disciple of Lee.
Well-positioned observers  tend to  take the  view that  Chen’s  relations  with Lee  are
respectful, but not particularly close51. Chen has continued on a road earlier travelled
by Lee, but not necessarily because of Lee.
39 It is perhaps more appropriate then to see the major change in Taipei’s cross-Strait
policy as not one between two political parties’ or two governments’ policies/positions,
but rather as a long-term gradual transformation spanning two decades and affecting
the whole society. The gradual nature of this transformation should not obscure its
magnitude. 
More changes to come?
40 This brings us to a final caution on a conclusion. Although I have in this paper argued
that in substantive terms there was not very much change in DPP and KMT cross-Strait
policy between the first Chen and the last Lee terms in office, this does not mean that
we can as yet draw such a conclusion for the entire Chen period. Chen Shui-bian was
significantly hampered in his first term by his being a minority president without a
majority in parliament and with an administration not entirely under his control. In
the second term, he will be in a much better position to enact substantive changes.
With 50% of voter support and a last term in office, Chen is domestically in a much
better position to push through new policy initiatives. And although most observers
seem to agree that he is primarily a tactician and not an ideologue, it does not mean
that he does not want to leave without a legacy for his eight years in office. 
41 In this context it is perhaps relevant to note that, while Chen’s second inauguration
speech on May 20th 2004 was generally greeted as conciliatory in tone, he notably did
not mention the “five no’s” directly. The “five no’s” had been a key concession from the
Taipei  point  of  view towards  Peking,  and  Peking  had  been  relatively  content  with
them52. In their stead, Chen offered the sentence: “Today I would like to reaffirm the
promises and principles set forth in my inaugural speech in 2000. Those commitments
have been honoured—they have not changed over the past four years, nor will they
change  in  the  next  four  years”53.  This  is  a  suitably  obscure  sentence  that  can  be
interpreted either way. 
42 Chen  also  slightly  softened  his  call  for  a  referendum  on  the  new  constitution  by
including the following lines in his inauguration speech regarding passage of the new
Constitution:  “Procedurally,  we  shall  follow  the  rules  set  out  in  the  existing
Constitution  and  its  amendments.  Accordingly,  after  passage  by  the  national
legislature, members of the first and also the last Ad Hoc National Assembly will be
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elected and charged with the task of adopting the constitutional reform proposal as
passed by the legislature, abolishing the National Assembly, and incorporating into the
Constitution the people's right to referendum on constitutional revision. By so doing,
we hope to lay a solid foundation for the long-term development of our constitutional
democracy,  and  the  people’s  right  to  referendum  on  legislative  proposals  for
constitutional revision’54.
43 Again,  the familiar pattern resurfaces:  at  snail’s  pace Taiwan edges towards clearer
political separation from the mainland by taking full advantage of the grey and the
obscure in politics. 
44 Chen has already shown that he can play hardball with Peking. It appears that he is
gearing up to formally cement the achievements of the localisation trend in Taiwan
through a new Constitution. The circle closes. Chen Shui-bian appears to be following
in Lee Teng-hui’s footsteps also in the sense of revealing himself to be a bold political
schemer.
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ABSTRACTS
Surprisingly,  cross-Strait  political  relations  under  Chen  Shui-bian’s  first  term  as  President
(2000-2004) on the whole diverged little from the trajectory set in the last years of Kuomintang
rule. This article analyses the reasons for this continuity.
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